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Abstract
Since legal regulations do not generally provide clear parameters to determine when their re-
quirements are met, achieving legal compliance is not trivial. If there were a clear correspondence
between the provisions of a specific standard and the regulation’s requirements, one could implement
the standard to claim a presumption of compliance. However, finding those correspondences is a
complex process; additionally, correlations may be overridden in time, for instance, because newer
court decisions change the interpretation of certain provisions. To help solve this problem, we present
a framework that supports legal experts in recognizing correlations between provisions in a standard
and requirements in a given law. The framework relies on state-of-the-art Natural Language Seman-
tics techniques to process the linguistic terms of the two documents, and maintains a knowledge base
of the logic representations of the terms, together with their defeasible correlations, both formal and
substantive. An application of the framework is shown by comparing a provision of the European
General Data Protection Regulation against the ISO/IEC 27018:2014 standard.
1 Introduction
Generally, achieving legal compliance is not a trivial task for enterprises. Laws and regulations gen-
erally do not specify what measures should be implemented to match the requirements that they state.
For instance, in the European Union (EU), where there is the need to support a single market while
letting each country establish its own legal framework, legislation normally defines the safety/security
of products and systems only at a very abstract level, leaving to the Member States the choice on how
to demonstrate compliance2.
In this situation, implementing standards is a viable way for enterprises to create a “presumption of
conformity with the specific legal provision they address” [6]. Implementing a standard per se does not
guarantee legal compliance, but it can provide a significant clue of conformity with regulations. When
widely adopted and subject to repeated audits by conformity-assessing bodies, a standard offers an
argument of compliance. Of course, such an argument is a presumption, giving a plaintiff the possibility
to demonstrate that the organization failed to comply with the legal framework. Still, this inversion of the
burden of proof is often preferable to a personalized solution [6]. However, the problem of establishing
and assessing this presumption remains, and it may become a serious issue when new laws reshape the
legal landscape for businesses: while awaiting for the establishment of feasible solutions, an enterprise
faces the risk of liability for not being compliant and may, on that ground, be sanctioned.
1Livio Robaldo has received funding from the European Union’s H2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie
Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 661007. Cesare Bartolini has received funding from the European Union’s H2020 research
and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 690974.
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A domain that will need to be thoroughly addressed from this point of view is data protection,
because the recent adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)3, which will be applied
from 25 May 20184, will pose significant challenges for undertakings in terms of ensuring compliance
with it, as it brings major changes to the regulatory framework for personal data protection in Europe.
On the other hand, the ISO/IEC 27018:2014 standard, concerning public clouds acting as personal data
processors, can be regarded as a building block [6] that helps data-processing organizations comply with
the principle of accountability and with their obligations resulting from data protection laws.
We propose a software framework that aids in determining the formal and substantive correlations
between the provisions in a standard and in a law. The framework’s core is a logic-based methodology
to represent, in a machine-processable format, (a) the relevant syntactic concepts in the provisions, and
(b) the relevant correlations between them. In this paper, we describe this logic-based methodology and
exemplify how it works using provisions from the ISO 27018 standard and the GDPR.
The framework depends on two auxiliary functional blocks (see Section 3): (i) a logic knowledge
base that can be used, corrected and extended by legal experts, that stores the machine-processable logic
correlations; (ii) a set of Natural Language Semantics (NLS) and Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques that allow a user to browse a XML representation of the documents and to search and retrieve
the words, terms, and sentences that have been found relevant for correlation. The NLS and NLP
techniques will help users show the established correlations within the knowledge base. Any expert
user can contribute to reinforce, correct, justify, and expand the correlations. Due to differences in legal
interpretation, some of the correlations could be in contradiction. Interpretations from authoritative
sources (such as high courts) will eventually sort contradictions out.
Technically, the different correlations are expressed in a deontic and defeasible logic for legal seman-
tics called Reified Input/Output Logic (see Section 2). The selection of relevant terms and the definition
of correlations, requiring human reading, processing and decision-making, is therefore semi-automatic.
It will be supported by the extensible knowledge base; the process of browsing, aided by the tools and
techniques from the NLS and NLP domains, add efficiency and precision.
2 Related work
Reified Input/Output Logic is the defeasible logic that we propose as the formal language to express
correlations. It was designed as an attempt to extend the state-of-the-art research in legal informatics,
by investigating the logical architecture of the provisions, which are available in natural language only.
Reified Input/Output logic is a logical framework [15] for representing the meaning of provisions.
Contrary to the large majority of its competitors (e.g., [8, 10, 7]), Reified Input/Output logic integrates
modern insights from the NLS literature. Specifically, it merges Input/Output logic [11], a well-known
formalism in Deontic Logic, with a first-order logic for NLS grounded on the concept of reifica-
tion [9]. Reification [4] is a concept that allows to move from standard notations in first-order logic
such as “(give a b c)”, asserting that “a” gives “b” to “c”, to another notation in first-order logic
“(give e a b c)”, where “e” is the reification of the giving action. “e” is a first-order logic term denoting
the giving event of “b” by “a” to “c”. Thanks to reification, the logic is able to express a wide range
of phenomena in NLS such as named entities, quantification, anaphora, causality, modality, time, and
others. In particular, the simplified version of Reified Input/Output logic that we use in our example is
an extension of first-order logic that distinguishes three kinds of implication: “→”, “ ”, and “⇒”.
The implication “→” is the standard trust-value implication of first-order logic, whereas “ ” is its
defeasible [14] version. Defeasible here means that an implication “Φ  Ψ” holds by default unless
overridden by “stronger” implications. When instantiated properly, this notion of stronger implications
resolves the potential contradictions emerging because of the non-monotonic nature of the defeasible
reasoning. Reified Input/Output logic also includes other mechanisms to deal with unresolvable con-
flicts5. A possible solution to deal with this type of conflicts is to leave the conflict open until more
evidence will allow the reasoner to take a decision. This is, in short, what better fits a situation with con-
flicts due to multiple legal interpretations. The third implication, “⇒”, is a deontic implication. Taken a
3Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation).
4GDPR, Article 99.2.
5See plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-nonmonotonic/#sec-2-2.
formula Φ, referring to a set of pre-conditions, and another formula Ψ, referring to a set of actions, the
meaning of “Φ ⇒ Ψ” is “given the pre-condition Φ, actions Ψ are obligatory”, that is, the actions must
be undertaken if the pre-conditions hold. Note that, according to the interpretation of “⇒”, the formula
“Φ ⇒ Ψ ∧ Φ ∧ ¬Ψ” is not inconsistent: it only means obligation Ψ has been violated.
The framework in [15] further distinguishes the formulæ belonging to the assertive contextual state-
ments (ABox), i.e., the formulæ denoted by the provisions, from those belonging to the terminological
declarative statements (TBox), i.e., the definitions, axioms, and constraints on the predicates used in the
ABox formulæ. Formulæ] in the ABox are in the form “∀x1 . . . ∀xn[Φ(x1 . . . xn) ⇒ Ψ(x1 . . . xn) ]”,
where arguments “Φ(x1 . . . xn)” and “Ψ(x1 . . . xn)” are conjunctions in standard first-order logic. For-
mulæ in the TBox can be any formula in standard first-order logic augmented with the operator “ ”.
The GDPR is the most recent step in the evolution of data protection rules in the European Union.
The Regulation, which will apply from May 2018, replaces the current Directive 95/46/EC6, which
introduced a minimum level of protection but required implementation by means of Member State laws.
As such, the Directive produced a heterogeneous legislation throughout the European Union, although
with a common base of protection. On the other hand, the GDPR, being a Regulation, will be directly
applicable in all Member States, and thus create a homogeneous data protection framework in the EU.
The purposes of the GDPR, according to its promoter [13], are to align data protection rules with
the most recent developments in data-processing technologies, while still providing a legislation that
is flexible enough not to become outdated over the course of a few years. In addition, the rights of
the data subject are strengthened by burdening the data controller with new obligations, and enforcing
such obligations with heavy penalties. Controllers and processors are required to be compliant with
the Regulation, which sets up fines as high as four percent of the total annual worldwide turnover of a
company in some cases of infringements of its provisions.
The interpretation of the Regulation will be provided mainly by doctrine and jurisprudence. The
latter is not available yet: since the Regulation was recently published and won’t be applicable for the
next two years, no decisions based on its provisions exist yet. When it will be applied, relevant decisions
on its interpretations are expected to be issued by the Data Protection Authoritys (DPAs) of Member
States, by national courts, and by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). On the other
hand, some doctrinal analysis from legal experts already exists (e.g., [5]), and significant literature will
be published in the upcoming months.
3 Methodology
The framework we propose offers a computer-aided methodology to analyze standards to make an ar-
gument of compliance with respect to a specific piece of legal text, and is schematically summarized in
Figure 1. Users (who may be lawyers, regulators, auditors, or other legal experts) access a digital and
annotated XML representation of the normative texts (laws and standards). While browsing a document
and selecting the relevant concepts, NLP and NLS tools help traverse the rest of the documents, find
related terms, and recall previous correlations between them. Correlations from different sources have
different degrees of importance, which need to be tracked using specific metadata. The framework im-
plements a collaborative strategy to evaluate the stored correlations. The user’s decisions are stored in
the knowledge base, after being appropriately represented in a logic for legal semantics.
The framework, and in particular its knowledge base, does not pretend to be complete. Rather,
it provides the expert user with an updated knowledge that helps him take autonomous and informed
decisions, both when confirming the correlations the tool suggests and when choosing to define new
correlations. The knowledge base is designed to support defeasible reasoning, i.e., to tolerate (appar-
ent) inconsistencies of different interpretations of terms, by overriding general assertions into more
contextually-specific ones. Conflicts are especially frequent in legal interpretation, but they can gener-
ally be solved considering that the interpretation by higher-instance courts, such as the CJEU, prevails
over lower ones. In order to cope with interpretations of different legal weights, which may supersede
one another, the logic formalism that the framework embeds is defeasible: correlations can be updated,
modified, rewritten and weighed. If conflicts do remain, the framework still embeds strategies that help
the user take a decision.
6Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
Figure 1: The framework at a glance.
The methodology we propose is highly interdisciplinary, involving a strict interaction between law
and computer science. Its purpose is to establish correlations between the provisions in the standards
and those in the law. As pointed out in Section 1, correlations can be further divided into two different
categories: formal and substantive correlations.
Formal correlations entail a mere textual overlap between concepts. For example, formal correla-
tions would allow us to observe that both the GDPR and the ISO 27018 standard use the term “notify”
(see Section 4). On the other hand, substantive correlations are more complex and entail the analysis of
the actual meaning of terms. To assert a correlation of this kind, requirements must be met in a concrete
way. Following the previous example, to assert a correlation between a provision of the GDPR and one
of the standard concerning notification, it is necessary to verify the exact meaning of the term “notify”
in the two texts.
Implications that define a match are defeasible and can be overridden, for instance, because of a new
decision by a court or DPA, or simply because of the evolution of the interpretation in doctrinal analysis.
This way, the output of the methodology can be easily kept up to date by introducing new correlations
as they are developed by legal actors.
The methodology follows three steps to build the correlations, involving both a legal and a technical
approach. The legal approach is focused on the interpretation of the provisions of laws (the GDPR in
our example) and standards (ISO 27018), whereas the technical approach consists of modelling those
provisions into an ontology, and expressing the interpretation by means of logical formulæ.
Step 1: analysis of the provisions. The provisions of the law and of the security standard are ana-
lyzed by legal experts, who provide an interpretation of the terms used in the provisions and compare
them in search of semantic correlations. There is no need for this interpretation to be final, as more
interpretations can be added later, and old interpretations can be overridden by newer ones, but this start
requires a significant manual activity.
To support the execution of this step, legal experts are assisted by external NLP procedures that
suggest (semi-automatically and during the browsing of the documents) previous translations and cor-
relations on the basis of the information currently stored in the knowledge base. Ultimately, it is the
legal expert who must decide whether and how correlations need to be overridden. In that case, new
correlations are added and annotated with the source which contributed to define it (e.g., Court of Justice
of the European Union, Dapreco and Copreda Corp., C-XYZ/16). Implications by more authoritative
sources override defeasible implications by less authoritative ones.
Step 2: creation of legal ontologies. The legal interpretations are mapped onto legal ontologies of the
law and the security standard. Legal ontologies [2] model the legal concepts, parties and stakeholders
affected by the law, the duties and rights of each stakeholder, and the sanctions for violating the duties.
As per ontologies in general, legal ontologies are expressed in a knowledge representation language. For
this work, we chose the popular abstract language OWL, which can be serialized using various XML
notations. For example, the OWL representation of the data protection ontology will contain concepts
such as “controller”, “data subject”, “personal data”, “processing” and so on.
A preliminary version of a legal ontology for the GDPR has been defined already [1]. Albeit partial
and based on an older version of the GDPR, it was designed to express the duties of the controller. As
such, it can be used to find the correspondences between the requirements expressed in the GDPR and
in security standards, until an improved ontology is built.
Step 3: generation of logic formulæ. The third and final step of the methodology consists of gener-
ating the logical formulæ representing the set of provisions in the law and the set of provisions in the
security standard, as well as the implications between them. These formulæ are expressed in Reified
Input/Output logic [15]. An example is shown in the next section.
Associating textual provisions to logical formulæ amounts to converting ambiguous and vague terms
into non-ambiguous items (predicates and terms). Words in the provisions are represented via predicates
reflecting their vagueness. For example, the word “notify”, included in the sample provisions used in
Section 4, will be represented via the homonym predicate “notify”. These “vague” predicates may be
defined by adding implications and further constraints (axioms). Those implications will be defeasible,
so that they can account for different legal interpretations. Predicates are associated with classes of the
ontologies developed in Step 2 or with standard general-purpose ontologies/repositories belonging to
the NLS literature, e.g., Verbnet [16].
4 Generation of Logic Formulæ: example
We exemplify step 3 of our methodology. This step, which lies at the core of the methodology, is the
most technical, and more innovative than steps 1 and 2 which instead rely upon existing techniques. We
use a provision from the GDPR and an article of the ISO 27018 security standard:
(a) GDPR, Article 33.2: The processor shall notify the controller without undue delay after becoming
aware of a personal data breach.
(b) ISO 27018, Article 9.1: The public cloud PII processor should promptly notify the relevant cloud
service customer in the event of any unauthorized access to PII.
The formalization of the two provisions in the simplified version of Reified Input/Output logic we
use in this paper is rather intuitive. As explained above in Section 3, the formulæ will include predicates
reflecting the vagueness of the terms occurring in the sentences. Thus, for instance, the verb “notify”,
which occurs in both provisions, is formalized into an homonym predicate “notify”.
On the other hand, the provisions in the ISO 27018 use the term “PII” (Personally Identifiable
Information) while the ones in the GDPR use the term “personal data”. Although it sounds rather
obvious to consider the two terms as synonyms (as suggested in ISO 27018, Article 0.1), and thus
associate them with the same predicate, our methodology keeps them distinct, i.e., it formalizes them
via two different predicates “personalData” and “PII”. An additional axiom is then added to the TBox,
in order to correlate the two predicates:
∀x[ (PII x)  (personalData x) ] (1)
The axiom correlates the two predicates via a defeasible implication: all that is considered PII is
also by default considered personal data. Note that (1) allows the knowledge base to include instances
of PII which are not personal data. Those would be exceptions to the default rule in (1), and it would be
necessary to add further higher-priority axioms in order to consistently account for them.
In the light of this, the GDPR provision in (a) is formalized as follows:
∀e∀x∀y∀z∀ep∀ec∀eb [ ( (dataProcessor x) ∧ (dataController y) ∧ (personalData z)∧
(process ep x z) ∧ (control ec y z) ∧ (dataBreach eb z) )
⇒ ∃en [ (notify en x y eb) ∧ (nonDelayed en) ] ] (2)
In (2), “ep”, “ec”, and “eb” are variables referring to three events. “ep” is an event of processing the
personal data “z” (patient) performed by the data processor “x” (agent). “ec” is an event of controlling
the personal data “z” (patient) performed by the data controller “y” (agent). Finally, “eb” is an event of
data breach of the personal data “z” (patient). Note that the agent of the data breach has been omitted;
that could be unknown, but this is irrelevant for the obligation in (2), which concerns the data processor.
(2) states that for any data breach of personal information “y”, it is mandatory for the data processor
“x” who processes “y” to notify the data controller “z” who controls “y”. Such a notifying event “en”
must be carried out without undue delay; this is formalized via a unary predicate “nonDelayed”, which
is assumed to be true if the event in its argument has been performed without undue delay.
In (2), “notify” and “nonDelayed” are predicates whose meaning is subject to different legal interpre-
tations. Recalling the difference between formal and substantive compliance outlined in Section 1, we
note that the formalization in (2) only enforces formal compliance. The formula in (2) simply requires
the data controller to notify data breaches without undue delay, but it does not specify how notifications
should be performed for being legitimate.
For instance, the data processor could require the data controller to acknowledge the notification,
in order to make sure it was received. Similarly, the processor could be required to avoid sending
notifications of data breaches via standard paper mail, in that the time needed by the postal service to
deliver the mail could be considered as an undue delay. It is up to judicial authorities to establish the
substantive compliance of the obligation in (2).
Of course, we do not have the authority to decide whether (2) is performed in the proper way. In
our work, we only aim at providing a methodology to keep track of all legal interpretations of the
provisions. From a formal point of view, the knowledge base must be enriched with axioms defining
the conditions under which the predicates in the formula are true. Note that different authorities could
establish different (conflicting) interpretations of these predicates; this is why defeasible implications
are needed to model their substantive meaning.
Specifically, the TBox of the ontology will include defeasible axioms that define when, by default,
a data processor properly notifies a data controller. For instance, by assuming that email with electronic
signature and registered high-priority paper mail are both proper and prompt means to notify the data
controller, the following two (defeasible) axioms are added to the TBOX.
∀x∀y∀e1∀e2 [ (sendEmailWithES e1 x y e2)  ( (notify en x y e2) ∧ (nonDelayed en) ),
∀x∀y∀e1∀e2 [ (sendRegHPMail e1 x y e2)  ( (notify en x y e2) ∧ (nonDelayed en) ) ] (3)
In case a judicial authority later decides, for example, that emails with electronic signature are no
longer proper and prompt means for notifying data breaches, an additional higher-priority axiom will
be added to the TBox in order to override the first axiom in (3). Axioms may be associated to time
stamps (although this is not shown in (3)), so that the new axiom will override the old one only for
notifying actions performed after a certain date, i.e., since the new decision was issued. On the other
hand, the old axiom will still assert that emails with electronic signature are proper and prompt means
for all notifications performed before that date.
Formula (4) models the ISO 27018 provision in (b):
∀e∀x∀y∀z∀ep∀ec∀eb [ ( (PIIProcessor x) ∧ (PIIController y) ∧ (PII z)∧
(process ep x z) ∧ (control ec y z) ∧ (unauthorizedAccess ea z))
⇒ ∃en [ (notify en x y ea) ∧ (promptly en) ] ] (4)
As it was done for formalizing (a) into (2), the formula introduces predicates that reflect the vague
terms used in the text. With an important exception: we formalized “the relevant cloud service cus-
tomer” via the predicate “PIIController”. The reason is that ISO 27018 includes a constitutive provision
that defines the cloud service customer7.
Therefore, the cloud service customer is the PII controller, i.e., the organization handling the data of
the PII principals. In case the PII principals handle their data themselves, without any “broker” doing
that on their behalf, they are the PII controller, i.e., the data cloud service customer, that should receive
the notification of unauthorized accesses from the PII processor.
The final ingredient needed to (4) and (2) are axioms relating to the predicates occurring in both,
similar to the axiom in (1), which state that PII is by default considered as personal data:
∀x[ (PIIProcessor x)  (dataProcessor x) ], ∀x[ (PIIController x)  (dataController x) ],
∀x∀z[ (unauthorizedAccess x z)  (dataBreach x z) ],
∀x[ (promptly x)  (nonDelayed x) ] (5)
Axioms (5) are quite intuitive: for instance, the first one states that any entity that is taken to be a
PII processor, with respect to the ISO 27018 standard, is also, by default, taken to be a data processor
with respect to the GDPR.
7ISO 27018, Article 0.1: “The cloud service customer, who has the contractual relationship with the public cloud PII processor,
can range from a natural person, a ‘PII principal’, processing his or her own PII in the cloud, to an organization, a ‘PII controller’,
processing PII relating to many PII principals”.
It is easy to verify that every tuple of variables “e”, “x”, “y”, “z”, “ep”, “ec”, and “eb” that satisfies
formula (4) also satisfies formula (2) by default.
Again, such default correlations may be rewritten. For example, a judicial authority could later
decide that although a notifying action may be considered as “prompt” with respect to the ISO 27018
standard, it cannot be considered as being “without undue delay” with respect to the GDPR. In such a
case, the last implication in (5) needs to be overridden by higher-priority axioms: notifications would be
henceforth considered “without undue delay” with respect to the GDPR only if they are “prompt” with
respect to the ISO 27018 standard and they sport the extra features decided by the judicial authority.
Other instances of data breaches may be encompassed as well. For instance, ISO 27018 also imposes
the prompt notification of “unauthorized access to processing equipment or facilities resulting in loss,
disclosure or alteration of PII”. If we formalize such an unauthorized event “e” in terms of a predicate
“(lossDisclosureOrAlteration e z)”, the corresponding formula is obtained by inserting this predicate
in place of “(unauthorizedAccess ea z)” in formula (4). The correlation with respect to the GDPR
provision formalized in (2) is achieved by adding the following axiom to the TBox:
∀x∀z[ (lossDisclosureOrAlterationx z)  (dataBreachx z) ] (6)
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we address the problem of legal compliance, i.e., establishing how to be conforming to
regulations and laws. The problem is not one of easy solution for at least two reasons. First, unless
specific practices of compliance are directly mentioned in a law, what to do to achieve compliance is
often unclear for an enterprise. Second, it is becoming hard to cope with a growing landscape of laws
and regulations. To cope with such an overload, companies often resort to standards, which offer to the
subject implementing them (not full compliance, but) a presumption of compliance. The question of
establishing such a presumption thus reduces the problem to finding formal and substantive correlations
between the terms used to describe the practices in the standards (e.g., sending a digitally signed email
to the PII controller) and those used in the provisions of the law (e.g., duty of notification to the data
controller).
This paper introduces a semi-automated methodology to help practitioners find and establish such
correlations. The paper exemplifies the methodology in the context of data protection regulations (in
particular, the GDPR) and security standards (ISO 27018), two domains which display significant over-
laps. By following the illustrated methodology, one can build a machine-processable knowledge base
of logic formulæ that model and store relevant concepts from a law and a standard, together with their
possible formal correlations. The knowledge base, which will be collaboratively accessible, will have its
records updated and labelled considering the outcomes of specific auditing processes or decision of the
courts; in time, it will embed substantive correlations on which a legal argument for compliance can be
relied upon. It should be pointed out that the logic into which we translate the correlations is defeasible,
allowing them be overridden. The methodology herein is currently a work in progress and not fully
implemented yet. The complete methodology requires the definition of a detailed taxonomy of concepts
extracted from the law and the security standard. In the future, we envision significant developments of
the research presented in this paper. In addition to the technical skills needed to manage the knowledge
base, the methodology would greatly benefit from a close interaction with legal authorities. In a small
country like Luxembourg, this could be easily achieved.
Several technical challenges related to building and updating the knowledge base are raised. The
translations from natural language to logical formulæ must be uniform for excerpts of text that are
similar to each other. To achieve this, we must overcome the limitations of a manual translation, which
would be time-consuming and error-prone. For this reason, our work must rely on NLP technologies.
However, even at the best of their performances, current NLP algorithms are still unable to automatically
carry out the translation with a reasonable level of accuracy, so we advocate a semi-automatic translation
of the provisions. Similar approaches are applied to translations in general, where translators are helped
by collaborative tools such as the “SDL Trados Studio”8, which suggests, via pattern-recognition text-
similarity NLP techniques [12, 3], how to translate a sentence on the basis of the translations of similar
sentences that the translators have previously stored in the tool. Inspired by that approach, we will
8http://www.translationzone.com/products/trados-studio/
develop an enhanced text editor to assist the manual translation of provisions into formulæ. For each
provision, the editor will display the translations of similar provisions found via NLP procedures applied
to the provisions already stored in the knowledge base. Finally, we are aware that the knowledge base
must be consistent, i.e., without contradictions, even after having applied the defeasibility measures. To
check for consistency, we plan to store formulæ using a XML-based data model, and employ/extend
reasoners to monitor the consistency of the knowledge base, whenever new formulæ are added to it.
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